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A Baby with Two Mothers? 
By Peter J. Riga 
The author is a Texas attorney who is afrequent contributor to Linacre. 
Recently, Judge Richard Parslow of Orange County Superior Court 
ruled that Mark and Crispina Calvert are the only parents of a baby boy 
who was delivered of Anna Johnson, the birth mother. In other words, the 
fertilized egg from the Calverts was scientlifically implanted into the womb 
of Johnson who nurtured and carried the child to birth. This resulted in two 
mothers: the genetic mother (Calvert) and the birth mother (J ohnson). The 
judge decided that having three parents would be too traumatic for the child 
so he cut off all parental rights of Anna Johnson. The judge reduced her role 
to that of an incubator or babysitter with only the possibility of future 
visitation rights . The real and only parents of the child , he held , were the 
Calverts. In other words, the judge tried to resolve a reality of nature by a 
legal fiat of his word attached to a piece of paper. This, of course, was and is 
absurd. Only God creates by His word . Everyone else has got to deal with 
what is. 
It was absurd because no legal fiat can change nature . In this case, Anna 
Johnson was a real mother for nine months . The bonding process began 
when the fertilized embryo was implanted into her womb. She carried and 
nurtured the child for nine months and then experienced the trauma of real 
birth of her child . The child, in a valid sense, could be no one's child but 
hers. That is why she fought for parental rights and visitation, but not for 
custody. In this she was absolutely correct and the judge wrong: she was the 
child's parent just as much as Crispina Calvert and perhaps more. Given the 
situation (for better or for worse), she should have been given parental and 
visitation rights . 
But the judge was also correct in another sense. The new fertility 
technologies have completely changed the delicate balance of nature and 
biology. In this case, three parents created a fissure in the historical, genetic 
and human chain which will be difficult for the child to live with. 
Considering the best interest of the child, the judge tried to reduce the child's 
future trauma by mandating as "normal" a family life as possible. The 
judge's intent was well placed; it's just that it was impossible for him to 
repair or rather, to unite what had been irremediably torn asunder with 
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untold and dangerous long term effects on the child. Given the fait 
accompli, the judge had no other alternative than to do what he did . 
The second problem with this case was the deep mixture of ethnic 
backgrounds of the child. He now has a Caucasian father, an Ajiian genetic 
mother and a Black and Native American birth mother. This may well 
prove the most traumatic aspect of this case for the child. Ethnic identity is 
very important for a child. 
We are not, as some have argued in this case, building or creating a novus 
homo (new man) from the mixture of many ethnic identities into this one 
child. 
Races as well as individuals are inherently limited in ethnicity. It is 
difficult with one ethnic identity (Asian, Caucasian, Black, Native 
American, etc.); but to try and combine this many is to invite inevitable 
confusion, doubt and division. How will this child understand , and master a 
multiplicity of ethnic backgrounds in his life? At best we have placed a 
terrible burden on this child; at worst, we have put the child into an 
impossible situation which can result in terrible confusion and in a real 
identity crisis. No child coming into the world should face such a fate. 
We know that the whole business of adoption is painful enough. 
Adoptees want to know the birth mother, the genetic mother and the 
historical mother who are usually (at most) two. It is difficult to divide two 
histories in the adoption process. This has worked out comparatively, but 
not completely, well. To further divide this is to bring great pain to the third 
party - the birth mother - because she has had a great input into the life of 
the child, as previously explained. 
At the same time, this case should show us how deeply disturbing the 
whole process of the new fertility technology really is. What serious effects 
will. this have on the child? After all, when all is said and done, the most 
important aspect of every custody case is simply this : the child and its best 
interest. Its best interest may not be that of the parents, no matter how badly 
they desire a child. Not to consider the long term interests of any potential 
child and the effect of these technologies on him or her, is to act from 
motives of egoism and selfishness. In American society, we seem to do all 
that technology makes possible for us, not what is or will be in the best 
interests of the child who is the final result and object of the new fertility 
technology. 
While this new fertility technology has given us marvelous possibilities of 
birth to previously infertile couples, not all of it has been good . Witness the 
Johnson/ Calvert baby. And while it is surely incorrect to say that it would 
have been better that this child had never been born, his example should 
give us pause before applying such technologies in the future, particularly 
that technology which separates genetic and birth parents, artificial 
insemination, ova from third parties into another, etc. These technologies 
are therefore ethnically suspect and perhaps dangerous for the child and 
certainly not in its best interest. It should cause us grave concern, for 
example, when a lesbian wants to conceive a child via these technologies 
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and bring that child into a home without a father. 
Simply put, it is not ethical nor moral to do anything and everything to 
beget a ci:lild. There are certain ways of giving birth to a child that pose such 
suspicious long-term effects on the child , that one should entertain grave 
moral and ethical reservations about conceiving a child such as the 
Calvert/ Johnson baby. Cross transference of genetic material, back and 
forth from biological to birth mothers and fathers, is questionable for the 
future of the child so begotten. These fertilization technologies of cross 
genetic transfers of any kind should give us long and serious pause. 
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